The naturephilosophical challenge can be posed not merely to postkantian philosophy as an episode in the history of philosophy, but to the postkantianism that remains foundational for contemporary philosophy. In consequence of the philosophical currency therefore attaching to the naturephilosophical programme, Schelling is a contemporary philosopher. (Grant 19) T he following essays are attempts to take seriously Iain Hamilton Grant's claim in the above passage that "Schelling is a contemporary philosopher." Schelling is read in dialogue with key figures in the canon of European philosophy and critical theory (Badiou, Chatelet, Deleuze, de Man, Meillassoux, Merleau-Ponty, Simondon, Zǐzěk, Malabou), as well as in light of recent trends in analytic philosophy (Brandomian pragmatism, powers-based metaphysics and semantic naturalism) -and such readings are not meant merely to highlight Schellingian influences or resonances in contemporary thinking, but rather to challenge and interrogate current orthodoxies by insisting upon the contemporaneity of Schellingian speculation. To quote Grant once more, "Schellingianism is resurgent every time philosophy reaches beyond the Kant-inspired critique of metaphysics, its subjectivist-epistemological transcendentalism, and its isolation of physics from metaphysics" (5).
T he following essays are attempts to take seriously Iain Hamilton Grant's claim in the above passage that "Schelling is a contemporary philosopher." Schelling is read in dialogue with key figures in the canon of European philosophy and critical theory (Badiou, Chatelet, Deleuze, de Man, Meillassoux, Merleau-Ponty, Simondon, Zǐzěk, Malabou), as well as in light of recent trends in analytic philosophy (Brandomian pragmatism, powers-based metaphysics and semantic naturalism) -and such readings are not meant merely to highlight Schellingian influences or resonances in contemporary thinking, but rather to challenge and interrogate current orthodoxies by insisting upon the contemporaneity of Schellingian speculation. To quote Grant once more, "Schellingianism is resurgent every time philosophy reaches beyond the Kant-inspired critique of metaphysics, its subjectivist-epistemological transcendentalism, and its isolation of physics from metaphysics" (5).
Speculative philosophy is not dead; it is, in fact, enjoying quite a notorious renaissanceand the rehabilitation of Schellingianism has played a substantive role in this. Two decades ago, F.W.J. Schelling's name first resurfaced as a resource for contemporary philosophising in Slavoj Zǐzěk's The Indivisible Remainder, 1 and Zǐzěk's strategy of redeploying Schellingian themes for contemporary ends has continued to play a role, more or less subterranean, in the writings of many since (Gabriel, Laruelle, Nancy) . However, it was in 2006 with the publication of Grant's Philosophies of Nature after Schelling that Schelling was most fully revived as a dialogue-partner for contemporary thinking. Grant recapitulates the famous passage from the Freiheitsschrift in which Schelling bemoans the lack of a concept of nature in post-Cartesian philosophies 2 by extending it to all post-Kantian philosophies and even Schelling scholarship itself. Thus, Grant speaks of "all post-Cartesian European 1 A N G E L A K I journal of the theoretical humanities volume 21 number 4 december 2016 from philosophy about nature to philosophy as nature Grant' s project, as summarised above, frames the challenge provided by Schelling around the concept of nature. "Nature" is here to be understood in a maximal sense, and thus philosophy of nature -far from being some regional and derivative application of a pre-formed philosophical framework -is a "physics of the All" that itself encompasses all other philosophical domains. This is the "the physicalisation of philosophy" (Grant 41) in which ideas, moral values, freedom and even God are to be understood from the point of view of nature. Nevertheless, such a naturalisation of all forms of thought -a "dynamic physis of ideation" (113) -is not, in fact, the most radical feature of a Schellingian philosophy of nature, even more radical is Schelling's account of its very practice.
That is, rather than the "nature" in philosophy of nature (Naturphilosophie) functioning solely as an objective genitive (i.e., philosophy "about nature"), such that nature would be a derivative representation to be scrutinised and evaluated by a condescending subject, Schelling makes clear that "the true concept of philosophy of nature" is to be understood primarily as a subjective genitive, i.e., as nature's philosophy or, more clearly, philosophy as nature. 4 The philosopher must, in some sense, become nature in order to philosophise about anything at all -this is the genuinely radical demand at the heart of Schelling's project. This demand is variously conceived as depotentiation, intellectual intuition, abstraction, sympathy, ekstasis, Mitwissenschaft and higher empiricism, but always the complementary pairing of ascesis and transcendence is the same: the philosopher is required to abandon the human standpoint and participate in nature's construction of the world. Here is how Schelling puts it in On the True Concept of Philosophy of Nature: to philosophise, "I had to [ … ] posit the I as unconscious; but the I, to the extent it is unconscious, is not = the I" (Werke 4: 88). And similar formulations are to be found in the Critical Letters in its evocation of the mystic death brought about by speculation; in Clara's flirtation with hypnotic sleep as a philosophical tool; in the Erlangen lectures for which ecstatic intuition is available only to those "who have lost everything" (217-18); and elsewhere. One passage from the Erlangen lectures is particularly striking. Schelling expresses what the philosopher editorial introduction must do as an abandonment of everything the human might objectively grasp but must now release:
Here, everything finite, everything which is still a being, must be abandoned, the last vestiges of attachment must disappear. It is here valid to leave everything -not simply, as one is accustomed to say, wife and kid, but even that which simply Is, even God, as God too is, from this standpoint, just a being. (217) There is something of Brassier's epistemic nihilism in all of this: "How does thought think a world without thought? Or more urgently: How does thought think the death of thinking?" (223). But while for Brassier such a self-renunciation occurs under "a figure of death" (222-23) and so philosophy is to become "an organon of extinction" (239), for Schelling the destitution of the human standpoint, subjectivity's refusal to seize anything objective including its own objectification, in the name of immediate access to a worldwithout-subjects is, on the contrary, a performance of the very dynamics of life itself. 5 The thinker must mortify denatured human thought to affirm the life of nature -let itself become the site where nature is vitalised and comes to self-knowledge. Ultimately, this is perhaps closer to the last words of Thacker's After Life: the task is "to think a concept of life that is itself, in some basic way, unhuman, a life without us" (268). In fact, Schelling adopts the words of Jesus precisely for these purposes of describing how one can come into the standpoint of "free philosophy [ freie Philosophie]": "Whoever wants to hold onto something, will lose it, and whoever gives it up, will find it" (Werke 9: 217), but he is quick to add that this retrieval is that which "Plato compared to death" (218).
Many of the essays that follow are to be situated around this Schellingian appeal to abandon the viewpoint of subjectivity in order to acquire that position where the free philosophising of nature itself can occur. Charlotte Alderwick, Michael Burns, Marie-Luise Heuser, Yuk Hui, Daniel Whistler and Ben Woodard all think through the implications of Schelling's philosophical reoccupation of the productivity of nature. Burns begins the volume by pitting "the new materialism" of Bennett and Connolly against the dialectical materialisms of Badiou, Johnston, Malabou and Zǐzěk. Schelling is seen here as a neglected mediating figure in the field of contemporary materialism -and Burns recommends a more sustained reading of his work as a means of navigating the antinomies between the two camps, particularly as they have an impact on questions of freedom and politics.
More specifically, according to Burns, Schelling offers a detailed "account of nature as self-sundering, which supports the dialectical accounts offered by contemporary dialectical materialism," as well as defending a "realism" able to reconceive "the relations between human freedom and ecological politics" in line with the new materialist project. Burns thus concludes:
While dialectical materialism, and particularly [Johnston's] transcendental materialism, aims to think the de-naturalizing capacities of the human, Schelling provides resources to consider the capacities of nature beyond our own emergence and, in particular, to think the political and ecological implications of this natural basis of denaturalized human freedom.
In his contribution, Woodard provides a thorough summary of the epistemological presuppositions and implications of Schelling's naturephilosophical practice. Taking Taking his cue from Schelling's claim in the 1800 System of Transcendental Idealism that "the lamp of the whole system of knowledge [ … ] casts its light ahead only, not behind" (18), Woodard points out that there is much that must remain unknown in a Schellingian universe, since consciousness does not spring from the grounds of nature but always arrives belatedly. Such are the foundations of Schellingian scepticism. The view from nowhere is unavailable; instead, the subject must constantly spatially reorient herself in nature through navigational tools such as experimentation, diagrammatic gestures and abduction. The result is a far more pragmatic and sceptical approach to knowledge-acquisition than any non-naturalistic account of Schelling has ever countenanced.
Heuser also takes Schelling's account of space as her starting point, but in this case it is to provide a detailed consideration of a non-philosophical -specifically mathematical -lineage of Schellingianism. Heuser observes that a number of figures and movements in nineteenth-century mathematics -such as vector analysis, n-dimensionality and topology, Christian Weiss, Hermann Grassmann and Bernhard Riemann -work through versions of a Schellingian Naturphilosophie. In all these cases, and in line with the general tenets of Naturphilosophie, there is a tendency to consider the hidden motor of magnitude and relation in their prephenomenal productivity: mathematical functions are mapped as they self-construct from an internal perspective.
The contemporary stakes of Heuser's argument concern the hegemony of phenomenological accounts of space in the humanities. The descriptions of nineteenth-century mathematical concepts, such as extension and directionality, are intended to provide an alternative "speculative concept of space" that dominated modernity until being displaced by Husserl's return to an Aristotelian paradigm. In Heuser's own words, "A return to the speculative tradition of philosophy seems important in order to overcome the mental limitations that encase our existence within the boundaries of the phenomenological Lebenswelt."
Alderwick's essay puts Schelling's philosophy of nature into dialogue with the recent turn to the concept of power in analytic metaphysics (Marmodoro, Molnar, Mumford). This dialogue is threefold: it involves, firstly, showing the closeness of Schelling's philosophy of nature to contemporary power-based ontologies; secondly, describing the ways in which Schelling's philosophy of nature supplements and strengthens this more recent discourse; and thirdly, gesturing towards how difficulties in Schelling's attempt to ground his account of nature in the concept of power indicate problems that contemporary thinking on the subject still needs to face.
Alderwick argues that pan-dispositionalist accounts -accounts committed to the claim that all properties are powers -like Schelling's philosophy of nature (at least in some of its guises), encounter a problem of individuation or, more specifically, two problems: firstly, "how we can identify objects as genuine individuals given an ontology which entails that everything is simply a manifestation of powers in process" and, secondly, "once we have an account of the different kinds of objects that exist in the world we then need to give reasons for why we take the agent [ … ] to be causally or explanatorily relevant." Why, for instance, should a pan-dispositionalist consider the human subject -and not the powers out of which this subject is composedthe appropriate type of object for talking about free or determined actions? In the end, Alderwick suggests that Schelling's conception of a selforganising entity provides an answer that may be difficult for contemporary power-based ontologies to follow.
Hui continues the discussion of the problem of individuation in Schelling, considering it now in light of Simondon's and Deleuze's own materialist accounts of the process. Hui sees a basic structure in both Schelling and Simondon, refracted through the very different scientific paradigms with which they are engaging. For both of them, the oppositions inherent in a process give rise to a temporarily metastable "third," i.e., an individual.
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Hui traces Schelling's development of this model from the early reading of the Timaeus through the Ideas to its full exemplification in the 1799 First Outline. In all these works, opposition and its indifferentiation in an individual is interpreted through the lens of dynamics, framing the contraries as expansive and contractive forces. Simondon, on the other hand, is critical of the hylomorphic presuppositions that underlie classical dynamics, and instead turns to quantum mechanics and information theory for his scientific paradigm: "Individuation should be understood as an informational operation which involves complex informational processes [ … ] All these informational processes produce 'internal resonance' [ … ] and give rise to the individuated [entity] ."
Whistler switches terrain to the philosophy of language, so as to begin the task of scrutinising Schelling's naturalisation of linguistic sense in relation to more recent ontologies of sense, whether those offered by Deleuze or those of semantic naturalism. Here, Schelling is understood as continuing a project of "aesthetic naturalism," subscribed to, in various forms, by Goethe, the Jena Romantics and -most significantly for Schelling's own work -A.W. Schlegel. Such a project consists in the explanation of aesthetic phenomena naturalistically. In their theories of symbolic language, both Schlegel and Schelling extend such naturalistic accounts to the production of linguistic sense. Whistler traces this Naturphilosophie of meaning through Schlegel's 1801 Berlin lectures on aesthetics, Schelling's lectures on the philosophy of art and into his later essays.
Whistler's objective, however, extends beyond merely a careful reconstruction of this lineage, as, in the process, he tries to offer a sketch of a naturalism of sense capable of accounting for language and meaning as natural auto-productions.
nature and speculation in the middle and late schelling Alexander Bilda, Drew Dalton, Sean J. McGrath and Tyler Tritten all contribute to this volume by treating, often in critical ways, what have come to be regarded as Schelling's middle and late periods, namely texts and lectures dating from the 1809 Freiheitsschrift and beyond. These periods of Schelling's thought span the bulk of his life, yet are the least read and, consequently, the most severely under-appreciated. Each of these authors, even when consciously taking their distance from Schelling, helps to remedy this lacuna in Schelling scholarship. Most significantly, however, each handles Schelling in a way that far exceeds archival work but deftly situates Schelling in the context of contemporary speculations, placing Schelling into conversation with Maurice Merleau-Ponty, contemporary philosophies of nature, post-transcendental and post-idealistic philosophies, and the ethical and political concerns of contemporary French theorists.
Bilda argues that Schelling and MerleauPonty approach the same problem but from opposing directions. If Schelling begins with ontological speculations, then his task is to show how his ontology relates to concrete human experience and praxis, yet without already presupposing that relation by anthropomorphising his ontological conceptions from the start. If Merleau-Ponty begins from a phenomenological perspective, then his task is to show how one can legitimately embark upon ontological speculations beyond the "philosophy of consciousness." Schelling asks how ontological speculation grounds the scientific, ethical and political concerns of the human being, and finds that the latter are vacuous and inefficacious without a foregoing ontological foundation. Merleau-Ponty asks how one can get beyond or, better, beneath conscious subjectivity, and answers that a "psychoanalysis of nature" must be performed.
Schelling's philosophy (or at least a few key concepts in Schelling's philosophy) provides Merleau-Ponty with the tools he needs "to solve the problems of a transcendental philosophy that is reducible to subjectivism" and to formulate the non-dualistic ontology he believes to be operative underneath subjectivism or the philosophy of consciousness. In short, Bilda demonstrates how Schelling grants Merleau-
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Ponty the conceptual tools needed to move from phenomenology to onto-phenomenology, "from human consciousness to a realm that is not accessible for it." Merleau-Ponty not only equates intellectual intuition and ekstasis in Schelling but also returns to art as if the role of art had remained constant throughout Schelling's oeuvre. The grasping of art, through aesthetic intuition, is then also brought into connection with ekstasis. This allows MerleauPonty to wriggle free of the transcendental, but it also has the effect of retroactively unifying disparate concepts in Schelling, offering a glimpse of what Schelling might look like if his philosophy were treated as a continuous whole rather than carved into periods. Bilda, in effect, argues that Merleau-Ponty offers Schellingians a creative portrait of what role art and nature might still be able to play in Schelling's late philosophy.
McGrath rigorously pursues the question of whether there is still a philosophy of nature in Schelling's late philosophy, ultimately arguing for a "qualified No" while presenting an alternative, even if the names go unmentioned, to Grant and Gabriel. Explicitly arguing against deflationary -read atheistic -interpretations, McGrath argues that in the late philosophy Schelling's God cannot be naturalised. Instead, this God is liberated from nature, which frees both God and nature, setting God free for personality and setting nature-philosophy "free from theology." In McGrath's own words, "God divides nature, or divides nature from himself (the same thing)." For him, then, the Freiheitsschrift of 1809 stands as the "hinge" to understanding the unity of Schelling's entire corpus, as it is here that Schelling first draws a real, even if ambivalent, distinction between God and nature, but without yet attributing this division, as he will in the 1830s and 1840s, to a free and deliberate decision of a God who "acts" rather than a God that simply "moves" itself. Utilising the term "consistency" as a logical principle rather than as the requirement that a thinker must assert the same thing throughout her career, McGrath thus reveals a consistency in Schelling's thought from early to late. The basic divisions of his philosophy remained consistent, even if their (dis)articulation -e.g., the way nature and God are differently associated and/or dissociated throughout his career -changes.
McGrath's piece provides a Schellingian model for rethinking the (dis)articulation between revelation and reason. He shows that in Schelling's late philosophy reason is rightly regarded as a science of validity, a science concerned only with the form of thinking, and not as a science of soundness or truth. In turn, revelation neither suspends reason nor elevates it to something beyond itself. Reason remains free to consider revelation just as it does any other phenomenon. Philosophy of revelation is not revealed philosophy. Finally, in this context, the reader should remain attentive to the running sub-conversation McGrath stages between Schelling and Thomas Aquinas on this issue in the endnotes of his article.
Tritten's article pits Schelling against Kant's transcendental philosophy, arguing instead for an inverted transcendentalism, which elaborates the transcendental as subsequent to and consequent upon unprethinkable being. This is different from the critique of correlationism by which speculative realists have become so enamoured, because, as Tritten contends, it does not abandon the correlation between being and thinking but reverses the direction of the correlation. This reversal of direction means that one begins in being, "outside" the domain of transcendental subjectivity. Tritten's claim is that this does not commit one to dogmatism in the Kantian sense, because dogmatism occurs when one begins within the transcendental domain and then illegitimately transcends those inner boundaries. Inverted transcendentalism, to the contrary, begins "outside" or, more precisely, in advance of the boundary between inside and outside, immanence and transcendence. This "outside" is not relative to an inside, but it is an "outside" without an inside, absolute exteriority or absolute transcendence.
Tritten goes on to portray inverted transcendentalism as the coincidence of philosophies of immanence and philosophies of exteriority or transcendence. If this is a philosophy of editorial introduction immanence, it is absolute immanence. If it is a philosophy of transcendence or exteriority, it is absolute transcendence or absolute exteriority. In this way, Tritten draws this into relation with Meillassoux's "great outdoors" or "absolute outside," which is likely the more appropriate term than "absolute immanence" for exposing the rupture that is drawn between Kantianism and Schellingianism, even if Tritten also argues that Schelling does not repudiate Kant so much as radicalise him.
Finally, Dalton complements the preceding essays on the middle and late Schelling by turning to ethical and political concerns that Schelling is, unfortunately, too often thought to have neglected in this period. Pointing to the loss of a universal and actual absolute for post-Kantian ethical and political theory, Dalton asks whether a speculative ethics and politics is possible for the contemporary epoch that would fall prey neither to dogmatism nor to scepticism, relativism or nihilism. Is universality possible only at the expense of actuality and actuality only at the expense of universality?
Badiou, Dalton argues, is only able to proclaim a truth, only able militantly to act in fidelity to a particular truth or truth-event. Universality thus seems compromised. In turn, Meillassoux insists that one can affirm the absolute without granting it necessary actuality. In other words, one can only "hope" for an actual, albeit contingent and (possibly) futural, universal. Dalton is not entirely satisfied with either Badiou's or Meillassoux's alternatives. He fears that Badiou's ethics of fidelity is too subjectivistic, as good and evil are based in the decisiveness of the subject, while Meillassoux's ethics is nothing more than an ethics of hope.
The search for a universal and actual absolute, Dalton assures the reader, is not impossible, but it does require recourse to Schelling's Freiheitsschrift, in which human freedom is conceived precisely as the freedom for good and evil. Good and evil are human possibilities for Schelling, but they are real possibilities because they each have an ontological basis antecedent to the human being. As Dalton phrases it, "For Schelling, to be a human is to be perpetually in a state of dialectical tension and strife. It is to wrestle with the duality of one's nature." The human being is the site where the strife between the principles of good and evil is played out, either harmonising these two principles (love) or bringing them into discord (hate). To will the former is to actualise a will to universality rather than self-will (particularity), thus providing a response to the postKantian problem Dalton so acutely sketched. It is Schelling, Dalton argues, who offers a universal absolute that is to be actualised in the here and now and not as a hopeful, but nevertheless deferred, future.
None of this volume's contributors have simply adhered to the canon -if, in fact, there exists such a thing as a canonical reading of Schelling and if, in fact, there exists such a thing as a unified Schelling -as they have all attempted to push, provoke and test Schelling unto possible breaking points in order to expose the Schellingianism already latent in the present and in order to hint towards Schellingian possibilities that remain for the future. In this respect, each contribution is an exhibition in speculation. As Schelling remarked near the end of his life in the untranslated Another Deduction of the Principles of Positive Philosophy [Andere Deduktion der Principien der positiven Philosophie]:
We are not in the domain of a necessary thinking, but in the domain of free thinking, i.e. of genuinely speculative thinking [ … ] To speculate means to look around for possibilities by means of which a certain aim in knowledge can be achieved. These are admittedly only possibilities at first, which must prove to be actualities in what ensues [ … ] (Werke II/4: 344-45)
Whether or not any of these speculations will, so to speak, pan out as future actualities, whether these Schellingian possibilities will gain traction in the contemporary landscape remains to be seen; for now, however, we are pleased to present them simply as possibilities for free thinking.
tritten & whistler notes 1 Bowie's reading of Schelling in dialogue with Adorno, Davidson and Derrida, among others, also did much to raise Schelling's profile at this time. Moreover, the edited volumes Schelling Now (Wirth) and The New Schelling (Norman and Welchman) were significant in this regard.
2 "The whole of modern philosophy since its inception through Descartes has this common deficiency -that nature does not exist for it and that it lacks a living basis" (Freedom 30).
